For the 2018 - 2019 academic year I will be a postdoctoral researcher at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University. Starting in 2019, I will be an assistant professor of political science at New York University in Abu Dhabi.
My main line of empirical research examines the influential role played by powerful businesspeople during political instability. Through field research and surveys of businesspeople in North Africa, I show how businesspeople’s engagement with emerging democracies is especially problematic when business is united against democracy. This outcome is much more likely to occur if a powerful state actor, such as the Egyptian military, is able to force businesspeople to work together to undermine democratization. You can access my CV from this link.
I also have ongoing projects in Bayesian modeling, time-series econometrics and psychometric measurement models that are aimed at advancing the ability of social scientists to handle noisy observational data. To that end, I am the author of an R package idealstan that implements new forms of the ideal point model (latent variable model) that is particularly applicable to studying public opinion, legislative activity and social media.
PhD in Foreign Affairs, 2018
University of Virginia
MA in Middle East Studies, 2010
George Washington University
BA in International Relations, 2008
Wheaton College IL
Fri, Aug 31, 2018, American Political Science Association Annual Conferece 2018
Wed, Aug 29, 2018, Preconference on Politics and Computational Social Science
Thu, Jan 11, 2018, StanCon 2018 Conference
Employing a massive dataset of Tweets from 2013 and a new cross-national and dynamic IRT ideal point model, we identify the distinction between polarization happening within a country’s borders and polarization influenced by events in other countries.
My dissertation is a comprehensive evaluation of how businesses build coalitions for and against democratization in North Africa. I mix intensive field research with online survey experiments to gain new insights into how businesspeople influence politics in emerging democracies.
Despite their popularity, linear fixed effects models can be a painful experience for applied researchers. Our paper shows that some of these problems stem from the wide application of the two-way fixed effects model as opposed to the simpler and easier to interpret one-way fixed effects models.
I put forward a Bayesian IRT model that is capable of handling legislator absence as a form of data that can increase the precision of ideal point estimates.